- 36. Deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations set forth in paragraph "36" of the complaint.
- 37. Deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations set forth in paragraph "37" of the Complaint.
- 38. Deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations set forth in paragraph "38" of the complaint.
- 39. Deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations set forth in paragraph "39" of the complaint.
- 40. Deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations set forth in paragraph "40" of the complaint.
- 41. In response to the allegations set forth in paragraph "41" of the Complaint, defendants repeat and reallege the responses set forth in the preceding paragraphs "1" through "40" of this answer, as if fully set forth herein.
- 42. Paragraph "42" of the complaint sets forth conclusions of law rather than averments of fact and, accordingly, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, defendants deny all such allegations.
- 43. Paragraph "43" of the complaint sets forth conclusions of law rather than averments of fact and, accordingly, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, defendants deny all such allegations.
- 44. Paragraph "44" of the complaint sets forth conclusions of law rather than averments of fact and, accordingly, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, defendants deny all such allegations.
 - 45. Deny the allegations set forth in paragraph "45" of the complaint.

- 46. Deny the allegations set forth in paragraph "46" of the complaint.
- 47. In response to the allegations set forth in paragraph "47" of the complaint, defendants repeat and reallege the responses set forth in the preceding paragraphs "1" through "46" of this answer, as if fully set forth herein.
 - 48. Deny the allegations set forth in paragraph "48" of the complaint.
- 49. Paragraph "49" of the complaint sets forth conclusions of law rather than averments of fact and, accordingly, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, defendants deny all such allegations.
 - 50. Deny the allegations set forth in paragraph "50" of the complaint.
- 51. In response to the allegations set forth in paragraph "51" of the complaint, defendants repeat and reallege the responses set forth in the preceding paragraphs "1" through "50" of this answer, as if fully set forth herein.
 - 52. Deny the allegations set forth in paragraph "52" of the complaint.
 - 53. Deny the allegations set forth in paragraph "53" of the complaint.
 - 54. Deny the allegations set forth in paragraph "54" of the complaint.
- 55. In response to the allegations set forth in paragraph "55" of the complaint, defendants repeat and reallege the responses set forth in the preceding paragraphs "1" through "54" of this answer, as if fully set forth herein.
- 56. Paragraph "56" of the complaint sets forth conclusions of law rather than averments of fact and, accordingly, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, defendants deny all such allegations.
 - 57. Deny the allegations set forth in paragraph "57" of the complaint.
 - 58. Deny the allegations set forth in paragraph "58" of the complaint.

- 59. Deny the allegations set forth in paragraph "59" of the complaint.
- 60. In response to the allegations set forth in paragraph "60" of the complaint, defendants repeat and reallege the responses set forth in the preceding paragraphs "1" through "59" of this answer, as if fully set forth herein.
 - 61. Deny the allegations set forth in paragraph "61" of the complaint.
- 62. Deny the allegations set forth in paragraph "62" of the complaint and all subparts thereto.

AS AND FOR A FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:

63. The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

AS AND FOR A SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:

64. Defendants have not violated any rights, privileges or immunities under the Constitution or laws of the United States or the State of New York or any political subdivision thereof.

AS AND FOR A THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:

65. Defendant Kelly has not violated any clearly established constitutional or statutory rights of which a reasonable person should have known and therefore is protected by qualified immunity.

AS AND FOR A FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:

66. Any injury alleged to have been sustained resulted from plaintiff's own culpable or negligent conduct or that of a third party and was not the proximate result of any act of defendants.

AS AND FOR A FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:

67. Defendant Kelly had no personal involvement in any incidents alleged in plaintiff's complaint.

AS AND FOR A SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:

68. This action may be barred in whole, or in part, by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and/or res judicata.

AS AND FOR A SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:

69. This action may be barred in whole or in part, by the applicable statute of limitations.

AS AND FOR AN EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:

70. At all times relevant to the acts alleged in the Complaint, the duties and functions of defendant City's officials entailed the reasonable exercise of proper and lawful discretion. Therefore, defendant City of New York is entitled to governmental immunity from liability.

AS AND FOR A NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:

71. The Property Clerk of the New York City Police Department is a non-suable entity.

AS AND FOR A TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:

72. Plaintiff has failed to exhaust state remedies.

AS AND FOR AN ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:

73. Plaintiff has failed to comply with the conditions precedent to suit.

WHEREFORE, defendants the City of New York, Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, and the Property Clerk of the New York City Police Department request judgment dismissing the Complaint in its entirety, together with the costs and disbursements of this action, and such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Dated:

New York, New York August 3, 2007

MICHAEL A. CARDOZO
Corporation Counsel of the
City of New York
Attorney for Defendants the City of
New York, Police Commissioner
Raymond Kelly, and the Property
Clerk of the New York City Police
Department
100 Church Street, Room 3-195
New York, New York 10007
(212) 788-0422

By:

Basil C. Sitaras (BS-1027) Assistant Corporation Counsel

TO: Steven Kessler, Esq. (Via ECF)
Attorney for Plaintiff
122 East 42nd Street, Suite 606
New York, New York 10168

07 CV 3782 (RMB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MARK KAPITI,

Plaintiff,

-against-

RAYMOND W. KELLY, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the New York City Police Department, PROPERTY CLERK, New York City Police Dept, and THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

Defendants.

ANSWER

MICHAEL A. CARDOZO

Corporation Counsel of the City of New York
Attorney for Defendants
100 Church Street
New York, New York 10007

Of Counsel: Basil C. Sitaras Tel: (212) 788-0422

Due and timely service is hereby admitted.	
New York, N.Y, 20	07
	q.
Attorney for	•••

Exhibit "F"

9 day of Max 2008 Sworn to before me this

Process Services Lic #

06115

Commission Expires July 1, 20

Exhibit "G"

PETITION AND NOTICE OF HEARING

A 2006 ACURA, was seized by the New York City Police Department on MAY 15, 2006 under property clerk invoice (voucher) #B103699, as the alleged instrumentality of a crime, pursuant to section 14-140 of the New York City Administrative Code. It is the intention of the Police Department to commence a civil forfeiture proceeding in order to confiscate the vehicle, and to retain the vehicle until the conclusion of those proceedings. Your acceptance of a hearing to contest the Police Department's retention of the above mentioned vehicle was received by the Police Department on May 23, 2006. The hearing has been scheduled for:

DATE:

JUNE 05, 2006

TIME:

-2:00 PM

PLACE:

New York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH)

40 Rector Street, 6th Floor

New York, New York 10006-1705.

Phone: (212) 442-4900 FAX: (212) 442-8910 TDD: (212) 442-4939

In cases in which the District Attorney has determined that the vehicle is needed as evidence in a criminal proceeding, including any appeals in any such proceeding, the hearing may not be held during the period the vehicle is so needed.

At the hearing, you have the right to be present in person, and you have the right to be represented by an attorney or other representative. If you choose to be represented by an attorney or other representative, that person must file a notice of appearance with OATH prior to the commencement of the hearing. If you fail to appear at the hearing, either in person or by an authorized representative, the presiding judge may declare you to be in default, may determine that you have waived your right to a hearing, may decide the case against you in your absence, and may make other determinations in your absence.

You have a right to file an answer to this petition with OATH before the commencement of the hearing. OATH's rules of practice and procedure are published in title 48 of the Rules of the City of New York, and copies are available at OATH's offices.

New York City Police Department Legal Bureau, Civil Enforcement Unit

By:

Gina Klein

2 Lafayette Street, 5th Floor New York, New York 10007 (917) 454-1111 S# 06/1678

BRONX SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL DIVISION

2006BX026125



THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

ANGEL TOLEDI M/33

2. MARK KAPITI M/35 -/81

Defendants

STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF THE BRONX

PO MAUREEN ENNIS of VICE ED, Shield# 2705, states that on or about May 15, 2006 at approximately 10:15 PM at corner of Sedgwick Avenue & Stevenson Place, County of the Bronx, State of New York,

THE DEFENDANTS, ACTING IN CONCERT, COMMITTED THE OFFENSES OF:

1 (M) P.L. 270.00(2)(a)(ii)

Unlawfully Dealing with Fireworks

Unlawfully Dealing with Fireworks

2 (M) P.L. 270.00(2)(a)(i) 3 (V) P.L. 270.00(2)(b)(i)

Unlawfully Dealing with Fireworks

IN THAT THE DEFENDANTS, ACTING IN CONCERT, DID: did offer or expose for sale, sell or furnish, any fireworks or dangerous fireworks valued at five hundred dollars or more; did offer or expose for sale, sell or furnish, any fireworks dangerous fireworks and did possess, use, explode or cause to explode any fireworks or dangerous fireworks.

THE GROUNDS FOR THE DEPONENT'S BELIEF ARE AS FOLLOWS:

Deponent states that, at the above time and place, deponent observed defendants acting in concert, in that, she observed both defendants placing fifteen (15) boxes inside the cargo compartment of a 2006 Acura SUV, New York license plate number DNC4337. Deponent further states that several of said fifteen (15) boxes were labeled: FIREWORKS. Deponent further states that the above mentioned hoxes contained a marianta. above mentioned boxes contained a variety of explosive items. Deponent furth states that said fireworks were valued in excess of five hundred dollars (\$500 United States currency.

Deponent further states that neither defendant had a license or permit and the law to possess said fireworks required by law to possess said fireworks. Deponent further states that, be

SUV HALD FOR FORFEITURE
7/11 MEP DOR

Page 1 of 2



Seizure #: 06-1678 Voucher #: B103699 VIN #: 2HNYD18666H516660 LICE PERCONSISSION Intake Date: 05/19/06 Veh Make: ACURA Plate #: DNC4337 Arrest #: B0663293 *Storage #: 06P00473 Veh Year: 2006 Plate State: NY Index #: *Forfeiture #: *Veh Make: ACU *VIN #: 2HNYD18666H516660 *Veh Year: 2006 Crime: FIREWORKS **NORTH** Hearing Hearing Hearing Name **Accepted** Sent Notice Waived Defendent: KAPITI, MARK 1.1 05/23/06 06/05/06 Registrant: KAPITI, MARK 11 05/23/06 06/05/06 Title Holder: HVT INC., 11 11 11 Hearing Atty: TRIFFON CEU Release Status: RELEASE TO TITLED OWNER -Hearing Disp: NEEDED BY DA AS EVIDENCE - NO Stimt Offered: Y Stimt Accepted: Y CEU Final Case Disp: GIVEBACK- RELEASE ISSUED Retention Ordered: N Date CEU Closed: 08/16/06 Litigation Atty: *CPAP Release Date: 08/17/20 Classification: FORFEITURE Settlement Amt: 0.00 Lien Holder: Demand: Permissions: Below entered by tax #: 213138 on 12/19/2006 11:30:27 Rec ID: 213138 Notes: 12/19 - Confirmed w/ ADA Benevich that the D was brought to trial and was acquitted. I gave this information to Rudy Meola. (EMR) Below entered by tax #: 100 on 09/21/2006 16:50:22 Rec ID: 213138 Rob Fodera spoke with Rudy Meola, attorney for Honda, the lienholder in this case, on September 21, 2006; during the conversation, Mr. Meola stated that the attorney for the criminal defendant / titled owner prior to the lienholder's conversion, Mark Kapiti, is threatening to sue Honda for the return of the vehicle; Mr. Meola stated that he is going to commence an action for a declaratory judgment affirmatively holding that the contract was violated and Honda is entitled to the vehicle; he expects to name the Property Clerk as an interested party and I agreed to accept service of his S & C. RF Below entered by tax #: on 08/18/2006 09:51:19 Rec ID: 213138 Deft was info car was claimed by leasing company and released. EV Below entered by tax # on 08/16/2006 10:34:13 Rec ID: 213138 8/16/06 DAR rec'd. issued release to leasing co. KD Below entered by tax #: on 07/10/2006 16:59:41 Rec ID: 213138 Awaiting DAR. When recd, release vehicle to TO Leasing Co. File to cabinet. GT Below entered by tax #: on 06/05/2006 12:06:12 Rec ID: 213138

NYC 1

Case 1:07-cv-03782-RMB-KNF Document 50-5 Filed 06/03/2008 Page 13 of 15

CEU voucner Tracking System

Awaiting DAR. ADA Rita Benevich wants car for evidence, will call when released. 718 590 2705. File on GT desk. GT

Below entered by tax #: On 06/02/2006 14:50:57 Rec ID: 213138

HONDA finance will take possession. HONDA signed HH. File to basket for approval. GT

Exhibit "H"

Page 1 of 15

Service: Get by LEXSEE® Citation: 140 F.3d 406

140 F.3d 406, *; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 6445, **

MARCELIN ALEXANDRE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT CORTES, shield # 1420, CITY OF NEW YORK, and NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 96-2820

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

140 F.3d 406; 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 6445

September 22, 1997, Submitted March 26, 1998, Decided

PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Appeal from a decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Eugene H. Nickerson, Judge) granting summary judgment to defendants in a civil rights action arising out of the failure of defendants to return seized property to plaintiff.

DISPOSITION: Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

CASE SUMMARY

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff prisoner appealed from the order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York that granted summary judgment to defendants, city, police department, and officer, in plaintiff's action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, in which plaintiff claimed that he was deprived of an automobile and some jewelry without due process of law.

OVERVIEW: Plaintiff prisoner was arrested by defendant officer, who seized the automobile plaintiff was entering and jewelry in plaintiff's possession. Despite attempts by plaintiff's wife to obtain the automobile which she and plaintiff were buying, defendant officer turned the car over to the lien holder. Later defendant officer purchased the car himself. Plaintiff, his wife, and his attorney all attempted to obtain the jewelry, but it was never returned, and defendant city could not find the jewelry. Plaintiff filed his 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 action based on the improper failure to return the property and the failure of defendants, city, police department, and officer, to inform him of the appropriate procedures to follow. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants, because plaintiff did not have an ownership interest in the car and had adequate post-deprivation remedies under state law. On appeal, the court reversed because defendant city did not create a procedure by which a prisoner could contest release of his car to the lien holder. The court remanded the jewelry issue for determination of whether plaintiff had adequate notice of the actual procedure for its recovery.

OUTCOME: On appeal, the court reversed summary judgment for defendants, city, police department, and officer, because defendant city did not create a procedure by which a prisoner could contest release of his car to the lien holder, which violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The jewelry issue was remanded for the district court to determine whether plaintiff prisoner received notice of the correct procedure to reclaim it.

CORE TERMS: clerk, jewelry, deprivation, voucher, prisoner, notice, arrestee, claimant, lienholder, summary judgment, City Rules, post-deprivation, state law, arrest, seized,

http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=c79bb0dc5ba7b728bc8a56bca18aa9ab&csvc=... 1/23/2006

No. 6127 P. 1-82